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Conflict of Interest in the Board Room -

Misconduct "Market Discipline"
Cannot Kill
by Jayne W. Barnard

Ust as in hemlines, there are
fashions in legal scholarship. One of the current
trends emanating from the
"Chicago school" of law and
economics is the belief that "market
forces" serve as an adequate deterrent to conflict of interest transactions by corporate executives.
This view is held not only by
academics, who might otherwise be
forgiven, but has been adopted by
influential federal judges and at least
one member of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
The theory, briefly stated (usually,
a 20-page heavily footnoted law review article is required), is that a constellation of market forces disciplines
corporate directors and officers so
that they do not seek undue personal
gain while managing their businesses.
To these theorists, the world is
made up of markets. First, there is a
market for goods and services, where
companies shop for the stuff which
makes companies go. Second, there
is market for capital, where companies shop for money and investors
willing to put their finances at risk.
There is also a market for managerial
labor, where companies shop for high
level executives, and most significantly, where managers shop for high
level jobs.
How do these markets operate to
alter human nature? Well, say the
theorists, if managers extract too
much personal gain from the business, either in the fonn of excess compensation or through self-dealing
business relationships , the value of
the firm will be diminished and the
market for capital will close down lenders and investors will not be
willing to infuse growth money and
the managers will therefore find
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themselves in a stagnant business,
Thus, managers have a strong incentive to curb their short-term opportunistic instincts, so that their
businesses will grow and provide
them with greater wealth in the long
term ,
Alternatively, the Chicagoans say,
managers regard themselves as
commodities tradeable in the market
for managerial labor, where the best
jobs are a scarce and highly desirable resource. If managers are to position themselves to trade upward for
a better opportunity in Job #2, they
must first maximize shareholder
wealth in Job # 1. Since excessive
self-dealing is inconsistent with
shareholder wealth, ambitious man-

agers will not engage in conflicts of
interest, thus (1) limiting the likelihood that their businesses will become takeover targets and (2) enhancing their long term chances for
a better job,
Moreover, this market discipline
is enforced both by co-managers and
by subordinate employees, all of
whom , recognizing that their optimum compensation potential is
earnings-based, have shareholder
wealth as their predominant goal.
Anyone who has spent any time
around business executives will of
course respond , " Phooey. " And recent empirical research confirms
that the world does not operate as
the theorists would predict - that
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business executives in a position to
do so in fact chronically and repeatedly structure their corporate
dealings to enhance their immediate
personal or family gain. In both privately held and publicly held
businesses, the existence of one or
more "material conflict of interest
transactions" each year is the rule,
rather than the exception.
One might not find this surprising
in non-publicly held enterprises.
After all, one reason entrepreneurs
incorporate is to maximize personal
gain while minimizing personal risk.
So when the Wall Street Journal reported that, while Crazy Eddie, Inc.
was still a private company, Eddie
Antar, its principa.\ shareholder and
CEO, had "virtually [used] the company as a private bank," granting
himself $470,000 in interest-free
loans, paying various family members $75,000 annual stipends, extending millions of dollars of credit
to a son-in-Iaw's business venture
(supplying cassettes to Crazy Eddie)
and guaranteeing the six-digit
(never repaid) borrowings of still
another relative, it was no great
shock. " Sure there were a lot of
third-party dealings and tax shelters," said a company spokesman.
"As a private corporation, Eddie's
wasn 't dedicated to enriching the
coffers of the Internal Revenue Service." So long as the IRS didn 't complain, "Crazy" Eddie Antar was not
only not crazy, he was just playing
the All-American game of grabbing
everything he could grab.
But what of those publicly-held
companies where the managers, in
theory at least, work for shareholders other than themselves and are
thus subject to the soul-cleansing (or
at least conduct-limiting) market
forces extolled by the Chicago
school? Do conflict of interest transactions occur there too? Anecdotal
evidence is abundantly in the affirmative.
Item: DeLaurentiis Entertainment
Group, which went public in 1986,
and is now deep in debt - its movie
library and production studio on the
block to payoff its bankers - is still
run as if it were private. Its CEO,
famed director Dino DeLaurentiis,
hired his daughter as head of pro-
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duction (annual salary $400,000),
and his girlfriend as head of the
studio. According to Forbes
Magaz ine, he also authorized production deals with his son-in-law, a
videocasette deal in Spain and Portugal with a second son-in-law and
a distribution deal with a brother in
Italy. DEG made $27 million in loans
(as yet unrepaid) to two private companies owned by the DeLaurentiis
family, and another of $8.4 to DeLaurentiis himself.
Item: The directors of Allegheny
International - once a Fortune 500
company, now in Chapter 11 - have
been named in a shareholders' suit
alleging that they approved for
themselves and several AI executives $32.3 million in low-interest
(2 %) loans; that they approved
"without any valid business purpose" a $16 million purchase of a
controlling interest in a failing
Florida condominium complex in
which former Chairman Robert J.
Buckley and other top AI officers
had substantial financial interests;
that they caused the company to purchase a multimillion dollar hotel and
install as its manager (and resident
of a $1 million penthouse suite) Buckley's son, who had no hotel experience; and that they permitted other
excesses, including the maintenance
of a multiple-jet "Allegheny Air
Force" for frequent executive personal use and at least two fancy
homes - a "magnificient" Tudor
mansion in one of Pittsburgh's best
neighborhoods (cost after furnishing, nearly $1 million) and a resort
condominium bordering an exclusive golf course (cost approximately
$500,000) - ostensibly used for "dignitary" entertainment, but frequently used for Buckley's personal
enjoyment.
Business Week, questioning how
AI's prestigious, "independent"
board could have let these things
happen, noted that, of the nine outside directors on the 14-man board,
one was the president of AI's lead
bank, and four others had received
substantial consulting fees beyond
their normal directors' fees. One of
them, former Secretary of State
Alexander M. Haig, had secured a
contract to provide advice "in the
area of safety and protection de-

vices" at $10,000 per day up to five
days' work each year.
Item: Diamond Shamrock Corp.,
"an energy conglomerate with large,
persistent losses, " has recently been
castigated for investing in a semenproducing prize bull in which Diamond's CEO, William H. Bricker,
also had a stake; for maintaining a
$9 million working farm used
primarily by Diamond executives as
a luxury pheasant hunting retreat;
for using one of Diamond's five corporate jets to ferry Bricker and his
family regularly to their ranch in
Montana and for making a laterabandoned $300,000 investment
(against the staff's recommendation)
in a biotechnology company partially owned by and substantially indebted to a Diamond director. Apparently, the proceeds of Diamond's investment were used to payoff the
debt.
Item: Hom & Hardart Co., a food
service conglomerate which lost
$28.4 million in FY 1986, has been
involved in a number of conflict of
interest transactions in recent years
with Barry Florescue, its Chairman
and CEO, and Donald Schupak, vice
chairman. Lear TCB, Inc., which is
jointly owned by Florescue and
Schupak, has charged Hom & Hardart $1.2 million since 1984 for use
of two corporate jets. Shareholders
have challenged Florescue and
Schupak's sale to Horn & Hardart of
two regional Bojangles franchise
holding companies for $1 each plus
assumption of $8.5 million in
liabilities, claiming the acquisition
amounts to a waste of corporate assets. Florescue-controlled entities
own the property and collect substantial rents annually for eight of
Horn & Hardart's restaurant sites
and an office facility.
Item: Mobil Oil Co. president and
CEO William Tavoulareas has
gained considerable notoriety for
Mobil's multi-million dollar no-bid
dealings with Atlas Maritime Co., an
international shipping company in
which Tavoulareas's son Peter was
a principal. Tavoulareas's libel suit
against the Washington Post for reporting that he had "set [Peter] up"
in the venture was recently dismis-

sed by the U.S. Court of Appeals,
with the observation that the facts
surrounding the various Atlas transactions reflected an "[abundance of]
evidence of nepotism in favor of
Peter."
It is by no means clear that all, or
even any, of the conflict of interest
transactions described above impacted adversely on share value or
were, in the sense that reviewing
courts construe the term, "unfair" to
the involved corporations. What enriched the executives may also have
benefitted their companies. But it is
clear that, in these widely-traded
closely-scrutinized public companies, where the Chicagoans'
"market forces" presumably work
most efficiently, conflicts of interest
- some highly suspect - were still
present.
I recently dug more deeply to discover the extent to which conflict of
interest transactions occur in business. Using documents filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission during June 1986, I reviewed the
disclosure statements of 44 companies about to go public for the first
time. Of those 44 companies, 43 of
them (or 97.7%) had engaged during
the preceding three years in business transactions in which their officers or directors had received benefits at least $60,000 in excess of
their routine compensation. Seventeen (38.6%) had rented office space
or equipment from entities controlled by their executives. Nineteen
(43.2 %) had made substantial loans
to their executives, mostly at belowmarket rates and seldom secured.
Twenty-two (50 %) had paid consulting fees to outside directors for services ranging from investment banking to lawyering to advertising
copywriting. Twenty-four (54.5%)
had engaged in other types of conflict of interest transactions, including the sale of franchises, supply
contracts, the guaranty of business
loans, office sharing arrangements,
technology licensing agreements
and the sale of property.
Some of these companies were undoubtedly so closely held as to invoke the "Crazy Eddie" defense, but
others were not. Companies with
several hundred shareholders can
still, under SEC guidelines, be "nonpublic."

The news was not much better for
the publicly-held companies. I reviewed the 1986 filings for 48 such
companies and found that, of them,
37 (77%) had engaged during their
most recent operating year in reportable conflict of interest transactions.
Seventeen (35.4%) had leased property from their managers; eight
(16.7%) had made below-market
loans; sixteen (33.3 %) had paid substantial consulting fees to their outside directors and 21 (43.8 %) had
found other ways to provide special
enrichment to their officers and directors or their families .
The amounts involved in these
deals were not peanuts either. In the
private companies, annual rental
payments to insiders ran as high as
$982,000 annually; "consulting fees"
ranged as high as $606,000 and
executive loans reached $339,000. In
the publicly-held companies, consulting fees ran to $2,462,008 and
below-market executive loans as
high as $840,000.
Can it be merely a coincidence that
the managers of these businesses so
frequently found the best real estate
deal in town right in their own board
room? That the most accomplished
lawyer (or financial consultant, or
public relations consultant or insurance broker or "safety and protection devices" consultant) was a
member of their own management
team? That the best investment to be
found paying the highest return
turned out to be a below-market unsecured loan made to one of their
own executives?
What's wrong with this picture? If
it is true that the markets for capital
and for managerial labor work as efficiently as the Chicago schoolers
seem to think, then it must be the
market for goods and services which
is out of whack - a heretical thought.
It may just be that the marketeers
of the Midwest are wrong in their
theory. In fact there are many forces
less esoteric than "market" forces
which operate to limit conflicts of interest in business - IRS rules, SEC
rules and state rules requiring approval of self-dealing transactions
by "disinterested" members of the
board. The problem is, human nature being what it is, none of them
seems to work.

HAll my life people

have been coming to
me with plans to make
over society and its institutions. Many of
these plans have
seemed to me good.
Some of them have
been excellent. All of
them have had one
fatal defect. They have
assumed that human
nature would behave
in a certain way. If it
would behave in that
way almost anyone of
these plans would
work, but if human nature would behave in
that way not any of the
plans would be necessary, for in that case
society and its institutions would naturally
reform themselves to
perfection.
- Elihu Root
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